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THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991:
AN EMPLOYER HISTORY
ANNE K. KNOWLES*
Depending upon one's point of view, New Zealand's Employment
Contracts Act, which came into force on May 15, 1991, was either a disaster
or an overnight success. Most employers saw it as the latter, but, like nearly
all events to which the "overnight success" label is attached, success was far
from instant. Rather, it was the consequence of a great deal of preliminary
hard work.
For the New Zealand Employers' Federation, proposals to change the
country's rigid system of industrial relations were first mooted towards the
end of the 1970s. Until 1973, when a new Industrial Relations Act was in-
troduced, the country had operated under a statute which, although revised
from time to time, had effectively been in existence since 1894. This statute,
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, had come into being fol-
lowing the election of a Liberal Government and largely as the consequence
of a damaging maritime strike-damaging, that is, for the defeated union-
ists. The Act guaranteed unions registered under it the right to negotiate on
behalf of their members, with a prohibition on strike action as the quid pro
quo. Unions, therefore, became concerned largely with obtaining awards,
that is, collective agreements, by arguing their case before a Conciliation
Board or the Court of Arbitration. This led a later American observer to de-
scribe unions in New Zealand as "litigious, rather than militant organisa-
tions, the creatures and instruments of State regulations."'
Initially, negotiated awards covered only limited areas, known as in-
dustrial districts, but in time the negotiation of national awards became pos-
sible. Awards themselves were mostly occupation or craft-based, so that any
one employing organization might be covered by a number of documents,
such as a carpenters' award, a plumbers' award, an electrical workers'
award, a clerical workers' award, and so on. Unsettled awards could, for the
greater part of the period (until 1984), be subject to compulsory arbitration;
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union membership, if not actually compulsory (as it was for many years),
was effectively compulsory.'
But as time went by, the rigidities of New Zealand's system of indus-
trial relations became ever more apparent, creating problems that the 1973
Industrial Relations Act did little to alleviate. The new statute introduced
the disputes of rights, disputes of interest concept, but, as to essentials, left
the previous bargaining system much as it had always been. Disputes of in-
terest were disputes aimed at achieving a new award,3 or at achieving an
agreement covering a particular occupation in one or more enterprises,
while disputes of rights were disputes over award/agreement interpretation,
operation, or application, and personal grievance disputes, where an em-
ployee claimed either that he or she had been unjustifiably dismissed or that
the employer had acted in some way to the employee's disadvantage. Meas-
ures for dealing with disputes now placed in the disputes of rights category
had first been incorporated into all negotiated awards by a 1970 amendment
to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The 1973 Act merely
built on the earlier amendment to the Act, again with the aim of preventing
strike action related to such disputes. Work stoppages over rights-type dis-
putes had become increasingly common. As the quid pro quo for the provi-
sion of statutory disputes resolution procedures, such action was made un-
lawful.
With the new disputes procedures and the prohibition on strike action
when award negotiations were in progress, the framers of the Industrial Re-
lations Act doubtless hoped that the statute would preside over an era of in-
dustrial peace. This prohibition was, however, defeated, by a simple expedi-
ent: unions would withdraw their claims for a new collective document and
go on strike, often against an individual employer. Concessions gained in
this way were taken back first to conciliation, and, if that failed, to compul-
sory arbitration. Here they became the basis for an award covering all em-
ployers engaged in such work. The 1970s and 1980s were notable for this
sort of strike activity, with its consequent flow-on effects. Frequently, strike
action saw documents directed to specific enterprises negotiated at a higher
level still (second-tier bargaining), while any employer who, at a later date,
employed someone to do the kind of work which an award covered, would
be automatically subject to it through a statutory "subsequent parties" provi-
sion. It was a one-size-fits-all arrangement with, on top, the possibility of a
more generous enterprise agreement using the award as its basis. Award ne-
gotiations were conducted by national advocates-union and employer-far
2. Union membership was made compulsory in 1936, after the election of New Zea-
land's first Labour Government. After 1962, a clause requiring union membership was usu-
ally inserted into an award in the course of negotiations, while in 1987 the Labour Relations
Act, which superseded the Industrial Relations Act 1973, provided somewhat complicated
union membership balloting procedures. A brief period of voluntary unionism occurred in
1985.
3. The legislation also used the term "collective agreement."
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removed from the employers and workers they purported to represent. And
as they had been since 1894, where the union and employer parties could
not reach their own agreement, awards were settled by compulsory third-
party arbitration.
Even before the 1973 Industrial Relations Act employers were becom-
ing increasingly doubtful of the merits of compulsory arbitration, but they
were, interestingly enough, not alone in these sentiments. As early as 1970,
unions were seeking free wage bargaining outside the arbitration system, re-
flecting a 1969 comment by the then Federation of Labour that "compulsory
arbitration protects the interests of employers and restricts the efforts of
workers."4
New industrial relations legislation notwithstanding, the history of the
1970s provides a clear illustration of union determination to enjoy the best
of both worlds. Unfortunately, and union ambitions aside, the 1970s were,
for New Zealand, an increasingly inflationary period. The entry of Great
Britain into the Common Market brought reduced access to what had been a
traditional, and safe, market; there were steep and unexpected increases in
the price of oil (all, at that stage, imported); and, in 1972, an Equal Pay Act
required a re-evaluation of wages paid to women, with re-assessments to be
implemented over a span of three years. What had hitherto been a highly
protected economy began to experience the cold winds of change. The ini-
tial response was further regulation.
In an attempt to keep things under control, the National (conservative)
Government in 1971 introduced a Stabilisation of Remuneration Act that
provided for six monthly across-the-board cost-of-living increases and set a
7 percent guideline for new wage settlements. Agreements above the ceiling
were to be subject to approval by the Minister of Labour on the advice of a
Remuneration Authority established under the Act. But as is often the way
with good intentions, the results were not those anticipated. The "ceiling"
tended to become a "floor," as many unions sought and gained far greater
increases. Consequently, the Act was amended to give the Remuneration
Authority the ability to rule on Court of Arbitration awards. Earlier events
had served to weaken the Court's authority.5 This new intervention did
nothing to enhance it.
The year 1972 brought a new Labour Government, the Remuneration
Authority's abolition, and a brief period of unrestricted wage bargaining, in
the sense that no attempt was made to impose any regulatory limit. But high
wage increases in 1973/74 again saw a resort to regulation, first a mandated
wage increase, and then a total wage freeze, equal pay increases excepted.
4. Herbert Roth, The Historical Framework, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND
48 (John Deeks et al. eds., 1978).
5. The Court of Arbitration had the ability, for many years, to grant General Wage Or-
ders to compensate for increases in the cost of living. During a recessionary period in 1968,
the Court, in the interests of economic stability, had turned down a General Wage Order ap-
plication from the union movement.
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The introduction of the new Industrial Relations Act6 did little to change
matters. The attempt to regulate wage increases continued, this time by
means of Wage Adjustment Regulations. Unions, as a consequence, shifted
their attention to negotiating fringe benefits, in the form of allowances for
all manner of things from clothing to work in dirty or wet conditions. Price
controls were attempted, but nevertheless prices continued to rise and infla-
tion-and industrial unrest-to increase. In 1976 a 12-month "wage freeze"
proved unsuccessful, and in 1977, accompanied by government calls for
voluntary restraint, "free" wage bargaining was restored. In 1978 a new Ar-
bitration Court was established and, in carrying out its award arbitration
function, enjoined to give New Zealand's economic stability paramount im-
portance. In the event, however, the government's hope that "free wage bar-
gaining" could be conducted responsibly on a national award basis proved
unattainable, runaway wage increases were achieved even after the intro-
duction of the Remuneration Act 1979.'
It was at this point that the Federation published its first paper on bar-
gaining reform. Entitled "Balance in Bargaining," the paper proposed a new
approach to bargaining which, in the light of later developments, now seems
remarkably conservative.9 While pointing out that "[t]he combination of
New Zealand's legal and institutional procedures and the unrestrained use of
the strike weapon now gives unions a decided advantage over employers in
negotiations,"'" this brief monograph advocated only a modified version of
the existing system, seeking, in particular, award negotiations on industry,
rather than occupation-based, lines. With respect to negotiations for an
award-with subsequent blanket coverage (subsequent party clauses, su-
pra), state enforcement of the award, sole collective bargaining rights, and
financial assistance with the costs of negotiation-the right to strike or
lockout would be renounced completely. However, it would be possible also
to bargain on an enterprise basis, with the parties free to take industrial ac-
tion as part of the negotiation process but not during the currency of the
document negotiated. It was to be an either/or arrangement-not, as at that
time, an award negotiation with an in-house negotiation on top, plus general
adjustments outside the bargaining process, as had long been the case.
Change did not, however, eventuate. A further general wage increase
was granted in 1980, and by 1981 inflation was raging unchecked. As the
Federation had pointed out in "Balance in Bargaining," though the eco-
6. The Industrial Relations Act of 1973 came into force on March 8, 1974.
7. Initially, under the Industrial Relations Act of 1973, the arbitration function had been
given to an Industrial Commission, with an Industrial Court responsible for award interpreta-
tion, operation, application, and personal grievance disputes where these remained unsettled
after low-level conciliation/mediation.
8. For example, a 10.4 percent increase in the Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, and
Hawke's Bay Bulk Freight Forwarders (Stores) Award base rate granted by regulation under
the 1979 statute.
9. NEw ZEALAND EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION, BALANCE IN BARGAINING (1979).
10. Id. at 14.
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nomic interactions were complex, the evidence pointed to a link between
high wage settlements and high rates of inflation. The inflation was not
solely imported as many wanted to believe and "[s]imply demanding a wage
increase to match last year's consumer price index increase [would] not re-
duce this year's price movement, especially where there [was] no produc-
tivity growth."" The National Government's desperate remedy was the im-
position, on June 22, 1982, of a 12-month freeze on wages and prices. After
a decade or more of government intervention in the wage negotiation proc-
ess, it was a response which might be described as the ultimate in govern-
ment wage fixing.
The wage/price freeze, later extended to cover allowances as well, was
continued beyond its initial 12-month period first by the National Govern-
ment and then, following a snap 1984 mid-year election, by the incoming
Labour Government, ultimately remaining in place until November 30,
1984. To gain support for the continued freeze on wages and prices, the La-
bour Government promised to restore compulsory union membership, which
had been briefly voluntary since February 1984. With the agreement of both
the union movement and employers, the new Government also removed
compulsory arbitration, and, by the same amending legislation, established a
Tripartite Wage Conference to develop guidelines for the forthcoming wage
round. The purpose of the wage guidelines was to foster wage restraint but,
emerging from a wage freeze situation, that purpose remained unrealized.
Although the guidelines were set at 4 to 5 percent, in 1985 most awards and
agreements settled at 6.5 to 7.2 percent, with some considerably higher set-
tlements achieved. An inflationary post-freeze aftermath was soon apparent.
In mid-1984, the Federation commissioned a report that considered the
defects of the existing system of industrial relations and the kind of changes
which should be effected.'2 Point 6 of the Summary to this document indi-
cates the direction in which the Federation wished to move:
The aim in the long run ought to be the achievement of a more voluntarist
system, moving away from the rather corporatist, centralised system of
industrial relations and pay determination based upon institutional mo-
nopolies and imposed uniformities which are no longer in harmony with
the need for more flexible responses that can only be achieved by volun-
tary agreements that fit conditions that may differ greatly from enterprise
to enterprise. 3
However, by 1984, it was not only the Federation which had recognized
the need for reform of some kind. Late in 1985, the Government introduced
a "Green Paper" entitled "Industrial Relations, a Framework for Review,"
the preface to which begins: "The Government's pre-election policy state-
11. Id. at 10.
12. Ben Roberts, Reforming Industrial Relations in New Zealand (1984) (unpublished,
on file with the N.Z. Employers' Federation Library).
13. Id., Report Summary 3.
19971
5
Knowles: The Employment Contracts Act 1991: An Employer History
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
80 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
ment identified an urgent need to review New Zealand's industrial relations
legislation."' 4 The document itself identified by a series of questions the key
areas on which the important decisions were to be made, and called for
submissions. The Federation provided a detailed response which indicated
the extent to which its thinking had developed since the publication of
"Balance in Bargaining." The specific objectives sought by the Federation
were to separate the processes of registration of unions from their recogni-
tion for bargaining purposes; separate the bargaining structures and juris-
dictions for enterprises and industries from those for conciliated awards; en-
sure that the parties to awards and collective agreements were locked in to
negotiations, once begun, until the matter was disposed of; require the ex-
plicit citation of parties to awards and collective agreements; encourage sta-
ble bargaining structures in enterprise and industry jurisdictions, represented
by single bargaining agents on each side; reduce the number of agreements
covering any one workplace; eliminate second-tier bargaining; require that
enterprise and industry agreements be complete codes of employment; make
enterprise and industry agreements enforceable contracts for which the par-
ties themselves were responsible; and ensure that the sanctity of agreement
was recognized as an essential requirement for bargaining reform.
While national awards would continue for the interim, the Federation
believed that there should also be procedures for the negotiation of enter-
prise and industry agreements, with new bargaining jurisdictions leading to
the breakdown of rigid, horizontal, historical relativities. Flow-on effects
would be minimized because instruments would relate only to particular,
explicitly cited employer and worker parties. The Federation also favored
individual freedom of association, or, in other words, voluntary union mem-
bership. A public discussion paper "designed to stimulate discussion
amongst employers and other interested parties leading up to the formal re-
sponse of the Employers' Federation to the Government's Green Paper" set
matters out rather more succinctly. 5 "Our present industrial relations system
has had it," it declared. 6 New Zealand needed a system of integrity relevant
to the times where a deal is a deal and honored as such; where the needs and
circumstances of both the employer and worker are recognized and where
the law is respected; where we have good relationships in our workplace;
where productivity growth is encouraged; and where we create more jobs. 7
The Government received 188 submissions in response to its Green Paper
exercise and produced a summary of these prior to the release, in September
14. 1 NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW
3 (1985).
15. NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION, THE REAL AGENDA, AN EMPLOYER
PERSPECTIVE ON THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GREEN PAPER (1986) [hereinafter THE REAL
AGENDA].
16. Id. at 3.
17. This is essentially a quote from THE REAL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 3.
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1986, of its White Paper, "Policy Statement on Labour Relations. ' ' 18 The
Minister of Labour's preface to the Policy Statement noted that, while it was
clear from Green Paper submissions that a climate for substantial reform
existed, "there is little consensus on the nature of that reform."' 9 Conse-
quently, he concluded, the responsibility for decision-making shifted
"squarely on to the Government."2
The statute which followed, the 1987 Labour Relations Act, did bring
change, but not the move to genuine enterprise bargaining for which the
Federation had hoped. The Federation's submission on the Act in Bill form
was in three parts. Part A pointed out what the Federation considered wrong
with the Bill and just how much of the old system was retained. "The Bill,"
the submission stated, "fails to effect any real reform of the labour market
needed to accommodate economic change or the needs of industries."'" It
was not good law "because it denies any equality of status, initiative, or
rights to employers as compared with unions."'2 Part C of the Federation's
submission set out without prejudice changes which the Federation believed
should be made to the Bill if it were to become law. Part B provided em-
ployer proposals for labor market reform. These proposals were, the Fed-
eration said, echoing its original thoughts on industrial relations change
"designed to ensure a balance in bargaining by providing the negotiating
parties with equality of status."' The Federation wanted employers them-
selves to be able to initiate enterprise bargaining on a collective basis (not
unions, as the Bill provided), and was of the view that in small establish-
ments, individual employment contracts should apply. In the absence of an
award system, a minimum code covering such matters as holidays, mater-
nity (later parental) leave, personal grievances, and so on would provide a
safety net for employees not covered by collective contract agreements.
However, the Federation's hopes were not realized. Instead, one of the
most notable changes effected by the Labour Relations Act was the bringing
of state employees (certain transitional provisions excepted) into the ambit
of private sector bargaining. Prior to the Labour Relations Act, employees
of the state had had their own system of wage negotiations, a system often
accused of "leading" private sector negotiations. The new Act was to apply
to both the state and private sectors.
But while under the Labour Relations Act union membership remained
effectively compulsory, while the system which gave bargaining authority
only to registered unions was effectively retained (provision was made for
18. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, POLICY STATEMENT ON LABOUR RELATIONS IN NEW
ZEALAND (Sept. 1986).
19. Id. at v.
20. Id.
21. New Zealand Employers' Federation Submission to the [Parliamentary) Labour Se-
lect Committee on the Relations Bill, Mar. 1987.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 5.
1997]
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changes in union coverage, but the process was complicated and little used),
while only unions could initiate bargaining on an enterprise basis, the Act
did seek to eliminate second-tier bargaining. Employees were to be covered
by a single set of negotiations, and only one document, either the award or,
as the case might be, the relevant agreement, was to be enforceable in the
new Labour Court.
The Act created a new Arbitration Commission, charged with register-
ing awards and agreements once negotiated, but arbitration itself remained
voluntary with, for the first time, a clear statement that strike and lockout
action was legal if it related to award or agreement negotiations. The bar-
gaining process was therefore to be the responsibility of the bargaining par-
ties, although, as under the Industrial Relations Act, a last resort provision
allowed for intervention by the Minister of Labour in any dispute involving
a strike or lockout, or threatened strike or lockout, should intervention be
necessary. New enforcement provisions about unlawful strikes and lockouts,
other breaches of the Act, award breaches, and so on were included. Griev-
ance and dispute procedures were extended to union members not covered
by an award or agreement, provided they belonged to the union which had
coverage of their kind of work. To obtain registration under the Act, unions
themselves were required to have a minimum of 1,000 members.
The Federation, which had earlier complained to the International La-
bour Organisation about employees' inability to join the union of their
choice, again pointed out this problem, achieving this time a finding from
the ILO's Freedom of Association Committee that the Labour Relations.
Act's system of union registration "indirectly brings into question the work-
ers' right to establish and join organisations of their own choosing."",4 The
Committee also concluded that the 1,000 minimum membership require-
ment "might be able to deprive workers in small bargaining units or who are
dispersed over wide geographical areas of the right to form organisations
capable of fully exercising trade union activities, contrary to the principles
of freedom of association. '
It was, however, a victory in name only. Nothing really changed.
Amendments to the Labour Relations Act in 1988 and 1989 were largely
technical in character, the latter, in particular, providing new balloting pro-
cedures by which the incorporation into awards and agreements of compul-
sory union membership clauses might be determined. Then in 1990, a fur-
ther amendment to the Labour Relations Act, in force from August of that
year, introduced a form of employer-initiated enterprise bargaining that
hedged around with procedural difficulties and was limited to employers
with at least 50 employees. The notion of good faith negotiations was also
introduced, in effect a return to compulsory arbitration, although after a
24. CASE No. 1385, 265TH REPORT OF THE COMMrrTEE ON FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION 61,
66 (1989).
25. Id. at 66.
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lapse of time. The Arbitration Commission would be able to impose final
offer arbitration where at least two years had elapsed since the currency of
an award had expired (or since negotiations were initiated, if the parties
were not seeking to supersede a current award), where there was no disa-
greement about coverage, and where it could be shown that any party had
not been negotiating in good faith. Industry awards, as distinct from enter-
prise agreements, might be initiated at any time and could be registered
even though their coverage clause overlapped that of an existing, occupa-
tional award. Other provisions dealt with composite agreements (covering a
number of occupations), redundancy, and personal grievances.
The amendment to the Act, in Bill form, was opposed by the Federa-
tion, which did not consider that the proposals encompassed the range of re-
forms necessary to enhance labor market flexibility and accelerate bargain-
ing reform. In particular, the Federation was concerned that the Bill did not
give employers equal rights with unions to cite their enterprises in or out of
an award. For internal use, the Federation set out its position in an unpub-
lished memo dated March 21, 1990. Titled "The System of the Future," the
memo provided the following:
• Workers may join any union/s they wish.
" Union membership is an individual issue and gives no rights in respect
of representation, right of entry, etc. etc.
• Workers at individual sites ballot as to desire for organisation.
• If workers decide that they do not wish to be organised, individual con-
tracts, underpinned by a minimum code, apply.
• If workers decide that they do wish to be organised they may:
(a) put their bargaining rights out to tender;
(b) elect to join another existing or proposed bargaining unit by agree-
ment.
NB: 1. Membership of unit voluntary; however, all persons by simple
majority required to fund operation notwithstanding membership.
2. Bargaining agent may or may not be an existing union.
" Agency rights would last for a minimum of the term of the eventual
contract and a maximum of three years at which time members make a
conscious decision by ballot to:
(a) continue, or
(b) put out for new tender, or
(c) cease to be organised.
* Agency right does not determine the shape of the document.
• Employer has corresponding right to be a unit on own or to join with
others in a unit.
" Employer similarly must appoint an agent for the purpose of represen-
tation.
" In any event negotiations for application and scope of agreement as
well as conditions may be initiated by either party.
19971
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" First issue for determination in negotiation being coverage of docu-
ment.
• Probably no reason why multiple agents should not be permitted at ne-
gotiation. However, one agent per side would need to be given formal
rights re signing negotiated outcome and for purpose of document ad-
ministration for its term.
• No need for bargaining unit registration.
* No need for agency rights registration.
" No need for registration of negotiated document.
• Good faith bargaining required, i.e. meet and negotiate. No requirement
to agree. No compulsory arbitration.
" No need for [Arbitration] Commission.
" Court becomes labour wing of High Court.
• Mediation service competes with accountants/lawyers and consultants.
" Transition
• Workers covered by existing award conditions.
• Employer and worker agents entitled equally to cite out.
" This process initiates the negotiation but again does not determine out-
come (shape of any new agreement).
• In the case of worker agent initiative, citation could be for one or mul-
tiple sites.
• In the case of employer initiative citation, may be against any combi-
nation of awards applying in the workplace.
" Citation out takes effect (i.e., award coverage ceases):
* on achievement of new agreement,
* on expiry of existing award, or
* 3 months after the date of application, whichever is the sooner.
• If no agreement exists prior to citing out taking effect, you're on your
own.
26
But as things turned out, the election of a National Government in Oc-
tober 1990, two months after the amendment Act came into force, meant
that the amendment's provisions were never invoked. Instead, the new gov-
ernment focused on preparing legislation along the lines developed by the
Federation over the years. In opposition, it had come to realize that genuine
labor market deregulation was essential to New Zealand's growth as a truly
competitive economy. Although the Labour Government that came to power
in 1984 had gone a very long way towards freeing up the country's econ-
omy, deregulating financial markets and removing many existing protec-
tions, it had, as the 1987 Labour Relations Act clearly shows, lacked the
courage to make any real changes to the labor market. The changes that
were made were largely cosmetic, leaving registered unions still very much
26. NEw ZEALAND EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION, INTERNAL MEMO (Mar. 1990)
(unpublished, on file with author).
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the driving force.
These events had come to a head in 1989 when a Conference of Export-
ers brought home to the Labour Government the necessity of freeing up the
operation of the country's ports. But, even so, the final step was not taken.
Something more needed to be done, and-as had become increasingly
clear-it would be for the National opposition to do it, when in the course of
time it was elected to office. As a result, regular meetings were held
throughout 1990 with the National opposition aimed at convincing its mem-
bers that the view of industrial relations which the Federation had developed
over the years was the one which must prevail. Employers needed to be able
to negotiate for their own enterprises if the country was to be able to hold its
own in world markets. Otherwise, its standard of living, in decline for many
years, would continue to deteriorate. By the October election, the opposition
had been convinced. The Employment Contracts Act followed on May 15,
1991, incorporating much, if not all, of what the Federation had, over the
years, come to see as appropriate for industrial relations legislation.
And what has been the result?
The change from a highly centralized system of wage bargaining to a
system focused, almost exclusively, on the individual enterprise occurred
quite rapidly. Employers, not all of whom had relished moving from a
situation where they did not have to talk to their employees about earnings
because the matter was decided for them, soon came to see the advantages
of enterprise-level negotiations. Multi-employer contracts in particular de-
clined in number and, by July 1993, constituted only 2.5 percent of collec-
tive contracts covering 20 or more employees (such contracts must be
lodged with the Secretary of Labour), representing a mere 4 percent of the
total employed labor force.27 According to the latest Department of Labour
Survey,' 98 percent of contracts in the Department's data base are now sin-
gle-employer documents.
This complete change of emphasis has probably been the most signifi-
cant effect of the Employment Contracts Act. In an era of protection, cen-
trally achieved wage increases could be readily passed on to the consumer.
However, mid-1980s deregulation made such an approach entirely unsus-
tainable. The fact that employers, since the advent of the Employment Con-
tracts Act, have been able to negotiate on an enterprise basis has contributed
greatly to their ability to remain competitive, and so, of course, able to em-
ploy. The reduction of New Zealand's unemployment level from a high of
10.2 percent in mid-1991 to its current 6.4 percent level is a clear demon-
stration of the capacity of a labor market freed from institutional rigidities to
generate employment.
Obviously, the Employment Contracts Act has its critics, not least
27. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, 7 CONTRACT: THE REPORT ON CURRENT INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 1 (July 1993).
28. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, 21 CONTRAcr: THE REPORT ON CURRENT INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 1 (May 1997).
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among those whose hitherto protected interests have been undermined by it.
As an example, unions, like employers' associations, now have to compete
for membership and for the right of representation. And to succeed, they
need to show that becoming a union member and accepting union represen-
tation has advantages for the individual employee. Then there are the critics
who act on gut feeling, rather than knowledge. On this point it is of some
interest that an independent survey conducted for the Federation in 1995
found that of those most likely to disapprove of the Act (of the 24 percent of
all those aware of the Act who disapproved), 39 percent were over the age
of 55, 44 percent were retired people, and 35 percent were people not cur-
rently in paid employment.29 It seems that the Act is the victim of bad pub-
licity, rather than being the satanic statute some of its opponents still like to
claim. Of course, bad individual work practices have continued and will
continue to exist. No amount of industrial legislation will change that fact.
But they are the exception, not the rule. Nevertheless, where such practices
are revealed, some have automatically blamed them on the Employment
Contracts Act.
The MRL Research Group survey was closely followed by a survey
conducted by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER)
and reported in its Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion." This prelimi-
nary report noted, among other things, a substantially changed industrial
relations environment, with more people than formerly employed under in-
dividual employment contracts and a decrease in rates of unionization. The
most common changes to employment contracts as a result of the Employ-
ment Contracts Act were higher ordinary-time wages, lower over-time and
penal payments, an increase in flexible work practices, reduced demarca-
tions, increased multi-skilling, and increases in performance-based pay. The
most notable labor market outcomes were increased productivity and opera-
tional flexibility, and greater training.3
The brief Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion report was elaborated
on in an address given by the Director of NZIER and a Senior NZIER Re-
search Associate at a Federation conference in Auckland on May 15, 1996.32
Among many matters referred to was the fact that "[m]uch of the effects of
the Employment Contracts Act debate have [sic] focused on its wage im-
29. The survey was carried out in October and November 1995 by MRL Research Group
using its monthly telephone omnibus, MARKETSCOPE, which interviews 1,000 New Zea-
landers nationally.
30. NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, QUARTERLY SURVEY OF
BUSINESS OPINION, No. 140 4 (Apr. 1996). See also JOHN SAVAGE & DAVID COULING, A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF A SURVEY ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT
(N.Z. Institute Of Economic Research Working Paper 1996/97).
31. Id.
32. Dr. John Yeabsley, Director, & John Savage, Senior Research Associate, New Zea-
land Institute of Economic Affairs, What Do We Know about the Economic Impacts of the
Employment Contracts Act?, Address to the New Zealand Employers' Federation Conference
(May 15, 1996).
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pacts," with the comment that "surprisingly little empirical work has been
carried out on this issue."33 Some survey results, however, implied ". . . out-
comes rather different from those which many commentators had expected;
namely higher rather than lower wage rates."3
With respect to the statistical finding that over recent years productivity
performance in New Zealand has been below average, much-quoted by the
Employment Contracts Act's opponents, the same address noted that the
quality of the data on economy-wide productivity was "notoriously poor,"
and then offered an explanation on why this should be so."" Survey data, by
contrast, it was noted, tended to counter aggregate data, with the survey it-
self finding that productivity and related developments appeared to be "a
very central driver of the Act's impacts on firm performance."'3
The address, overall, adopted a cautious approach but, even so, con-
cluded that there was evidence that, at an aggregate level, the Employment
Contracts Act had contributed to employment growth while having no sig-
nificant impact on the long-run value of wages. Instead, by increasing the
stability of nominal wage settlements, the Act had helped to shift the bal-
ance of economic growth towards higher employment outcomes, with its
employment and wage effects, in turn, a component of post-1991 growth,
inflation, and income results.37Moreover, the address attributed better over-
all performance achieved by surveyed firms since 1991 (and the firms' con-
clusions that the Act had been positive for them) to the shift to decentralized
bargaining.
Earlier this year, with the aim of countering some Employment Con-
tracts Act myths that have continued to abound, the Federation produced for
its member companies an "ECA Facts" leaflet, using data from Statistics
New Zealand's Quarterly Employment and Household Labour Force Sur-
veys.38 This document's "Facts at a Glance" provides a useful summary of
what has happened since the Act was passed, and, where relevant, of what
had happened over a similar period of time prior to the Act's coming into
force. The facts include the following:
" Over 220,000 jobs have been created. For every seven jobs when the
Act came into force there are now eight.
" Most new jobs are full-time-67% as compared with 33% part-time.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 24.
37. New Zealand Employers' Federation, ECA Facts - A Comparison of Labour Market
Activity 5 years Before and 5 years After the Employment Contracts Act (Aug. 1997)
(unpublished, on file with author).
38. New Zealand Employers' Federation, ECA Facts - A Comparison of Labour Market
Activity 5 years Before and 5 years After the Employment Contracts Act (Aug. 1997)
(unpublished, on file with author).
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77% of employees have full-time positions.
* There has been a 16.9% increase in women's employment as compared
with a 14.5% increase for men.
* There has been a marked decline in unemployment, from 10% to 6.6%.
* Weekly wages have increased faster than prices, by 15.0% with over-
time, and by 16.5% without overtime. The inflation rate over the same
period, as measured by Statistics New Zealand's Consumer Price Index,
was 11.4%.
* Strike action declined. 328,158 working days were lost through strike
action from 1991 to 1995, compared with 1,371,232 working days over
the previous five years.
* The output of goods and services, as measured by Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), climbed more than 19%."
From the outset, the Federation recognized the Employment Contracts
Act as making a positive contribution to companies' economic development
and to improved labor market relationships. Nevertheless, in a May 1993
submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Review of the
Employment Contracts Act, it pointed to six matters which were then of
concern. Of these six, however, all but one have since been resolved, while
the remaining concern is not so much with the Act itself, as with the way in
which the Employment Court has chosen to respond to certain personal
grievance complaints. In far too many instances, the Employment Court
searches for some indication of procedural unfairness-unfairness arising
from the way in which the termination was carried out-even though a ter-
mination of employment was itself substantively justified.4 ' In that way, the
Court is able to reach a finding of unjustified dismissal and, accordingly, to
compensate the grievant.4'
Stringent procedural requirements developed by the Court, and equally
applicable to the giving of warnings about work performance or behavior,
have created great uncertainty in the minds of employers about what they
must do to establish a procedurally correct outcome. Understandably, such
difficulties, together with the knowledge that many personal grievance
claims are more opportunistic than real, operate very much as employment
disincentives. The Court's desire to protect employees from job loss is un-
derstandable. But for many employers and would-be employers, the uncer-
tainties and potential costs of taking on a new employee are now just too
great. These concerns aside, however, the Employment Contracts Act is
working well. And, certainly, there is increasing public recognition that its
retention is fundamental to New Zealand's continued prosperity.
39. Id. at 2.
40. See, e.g., Garland v. McHerrons Ltd. [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 486; Aotearoa International
Ltd v. Madsen [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 511 (C.A.).
41. See, e.g., Garland v. McHerrons Ltd. [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 486; Aotearoa International
Ltd v. Madsen [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 511 (C.A.).
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